

Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE

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VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM,NATO

SUBJECT: CSCE: FRG VIEWS ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

FOLL REPEAT STATE 107909 ACTION ANATO MOSCOW GENEVA 23

MAY 74 QUOTE

S E C R E T STATE 107909

LIMDIS

EO 11652: GDS

AGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: CSCE: FRG VIEWS ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES
(CBM'S)

GENEVA FOR US CSCE DELEGATION

1. FRG AMBASSADOR VON STADEN CALLED ON SONNENFELDT AND
HARTMAN MAY 22 ON INSTRUCTIONS TO PRESENT CURRENT FRG
VIEWS ON CBM'S. IN HIS PRESENTATION, VON STADEN DREW ON

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FOLLOWING:

BEGIN TEXT

A. CBMS ARE FOR FRG AN INTEGRAL COMPONENT OF THE ENTIRE CSCE COMPLEX. ALSO SOVIET UNION HAS AGREED UPON THE MANDATE FOR CBMS IN HELSINKI. EXCLUSION OF CBMS FROM THE CSCE CONTEXT WOULD CONTRADICT THE HELSINKI RESOLUTIONS.

WE CANNOT AGREE TO THE CONCLUSION OF THE COMMITTEE PHASE PRIOR TO A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION OF CBMS. AN INSUFFICIENT SOLUTION FOR CBMS COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED A SATISFACTORY RESULT OF THE COMMITTEE PHASE.

FOR THE EUROPEAN STATES THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CBMS LIES IN THE FACT THAT THE QUESTION OF SECURITY WILL BE INCORPORATED INTO THE PROCESS OF REDUCTION OF TENSIONS AS A CONCRETE COMPONENT OF CSCE. THE SOVIET UNION, THEREFORE, MAY NOT BE RELEASED FROM THE COMMITMENT TO CBM ENTERED IN HELSINKI.

B. CBMS IN WHICH THE SOVIET UNION PARTICIPATES DECLAMATORILY BUT EXCLUDES HER OWN TERRITORY NEARLY COMPLETELY FROM THE AREA OF APPLICATION, WOULD NOT SERVE THEIR PURPOSE. STARTING POINT FOR THE GEOGRAPHICAL AREA OF APPLICATION OF CBMS SHOULD BE IN OUR OPINION THE TERRITORIAL POINT OF REFERENCE OF CSCE, I.E. EUROPE. TO THIS WOULD CORRESPOND THE INCLUSION OF THE EUROPEAN TERRITORIES OF THE SOVIET UNION INTO THE AREA OF APPLICATION OF CBMS.

THE SOVIET UNION HAS REPEATEDLY AND EMPHATICALLY OBJECTED TO THIS DEMAND POINTING OUT THAT SHE IS NOT WILLING TO ACCEPT CONTROL OF HER SOVEREIGN TERRITORY TO THE URAL MOUNTAINS. WE HAVE TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE QUESTION IS NOT CONTROL OF STATES OVER OTHER STATES BUT THE ENTERING OF POLITICAL COMMITMENTS WHICH EVERY STATE ASSUMES AND CONDUCTS ON ITS OWN RESPONSIBILITY.

C. FOR US THE INCLUSION OF SOVIET TERRITORY IN ACCORDANCE WITH CBMS REMAINS THE CRUCIAL CRITERION. THE
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DEGREE OF COMMITMENT OF MEASURES TO BE NEGOTIATED OR THEIR MILITARY SUBSTANCE ARE OF LESS IMPORTANCE. HOWEVER, THE TECHNICAL CRITERIA OF CBMS HAVE TO BE SUFFICIENTLY DESCRIBED TO AVOID FUTURE MISUNDERSTANDINGS.

WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE THAT THE ENTIRE EUROPEAN TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION CAN BE INCLUDED BUT WE CONSIDER THE APPLICATION OF CBMS TO A MILITARY RELEVANT PART

INDISPENSABLE. ACCORDING TO OUR CONCEPTIONS WHICH ARE SHARED BY MANY OF OUR ALLIES OUR INTERESTS COULD BE GUARANTEED BY INCLUDING SOVIET TERRITORY UP TO 700 - 500 KILOMETRES OR OF THE SCOPE OF THE THREE WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICTS. THIS AREA SHOULD BE INCREASED IN THE INTEREST OF NORWAY AND NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK (KIEW AND CAUCASUS). ANYWAY, THE STARTING POINT OF THE DISCUSSION SHOULD REMAIN IN EUROPE.

D. THE GREAT IMPORTANCE WE ATTRIBUTE TO THE INCLUSION OF A SUFFICIENT PART OF THE SOVIET UNION INTO THE AREA OF APPLICATION OF CBMS HAS, ABOVE ALL, TO DO WITH EFFECTS OF POLITICAL COMMITMENTS BY STABILIZING AND OTHER COLLATERAL MEASURES IN THE MBFR CONTEXT, SINCE THESE MEASURES, CONTRARY TO OUR ORIGINAL PROPOSALS AND

EXPECTATIONS, SHALL EXCLUSIVELY APPLY TO THE STATES IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREAS, I.E. TO THE AREA FOR REDUCTIONS, THEREFORE FOCUSING ON THE FRG.

E. ONE OF OUR CENTRAL PRINCIPLES WITH MBFR IS THAT NO AGREEMENTS MAY EXCLUSIVELY APPLY TO OR AFFECT THE TWO STATES IN GERMANY. BUT ALSO IN THE INTEREST OF THE ALLIANCE AND OF EUROPE DEVELOPMENTS IN MBFR TOWARDS THE CREATION OF ZONES WITH SPECIAL POLITICAL STATUS HAVE TO BE AVOIDED, OR LIMITED TO A MINIMUM. IN OUR OPINION CBMS, THE APPLICATION AREA OF WHICH INCLUDES A SUFFICIENT SOVIET TERRITORY, COULD BE SUITABLE TO COUNTERACT SUCH DEVELOPMENT. FROM OUR VIEWPOINT, THEREFORE, CBMS HAVE A SPECIFIC POLITICAL FUNCTION WHICH DIFFERENTIATES THEM FROM THE STABILIZING MEASURES OF MBFR, AT LEAST AS LONG AS THESE ONLY APPLY TO THE NGA. IN SO FAR BETWEEN BOTH THERE IS NEITHER A COMPETITIVE RELATIONSHIP NOR ARE THEY
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EXCHANGEABLE AT WILL.

OUR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT COMMITMENTS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF STABILIZING AND OTHER COLLATERAL MEASURES AT MBFR WHICH SUBJECT THE NGA AND BY THIS THE FRG'S TERRITORY TO SPECIAL POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS WILL NOT FAIL TO BE INFLUENCED BY A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION OF THE CBM PROBLEM IN GENEVA.

F. WE BELIEVE THAT CLEAR TECHNICAL CRITERIA ON PERSONNEL NUMBERS, NOTIFICATION TIME AND DATA TO BE CONVEYED SHOULD BE AGREED UPON TO AVOID FUTURE MISUNDERSTANDINGS. IT HAS TO BE DETERMINED THAT ADVANCE NOTIFICATIONS HAVE TO BE DIRECTED NOT ONLY TO NEIGHBORING STATES BUT TO ALL PARTICIPANTS.

G. WE ARE WELL AWARE THAT THE US WILL NOT GIVE UP ITS OPPOSITION AGAINST ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS. WE COULD EVENTUALLY ACCEPT RENUNCIATION OF ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS, IF IN THE FIELD OF MANEUVER NOTIFICATIONS AND OF EXCHANGING OF MANEUVER OBSERVERS THE GEOGRAPHICAL AREA COULD BE ESTABLISHED ACCORDING TO OUR INTERESTS.

WE REALIZE THAT THESE INTERESTS CAN HARDLY BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT ACTIVE AMERICAN SUPPORT IN GENEVA. WE, THEREFORE, EMPHATICALLY REQUEST THAT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT SUPPORT THIS CBM POSITION.

H. IN OUR POINT OF VIEW CBMS ARE AN INDEPENDENT ELEMENT OF CSCE IN ITS OWN RIGHT. A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION WITH RESPECT TO PEACEFUL CHANGES OF FRONTIERS IS NOT

NECESSARILY A COMPENSATING ITEM FOR A FAILURE AT CBMS. BOTH PROBLEMS HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH SEPARATELY. LINKAGE WITH POINTS FROM BASKET 3 CANNOT BE CONSIDERED EITHER. REGARDING THE NEGOTIATION TACTICS IT IS, THEREFORE, IMPORTANT THAT THE QUESTION OF PEACEFUL CHANGE OF FRONTIERS HAS TO BE CLARIFIED BEFORE THE BARGAINING ON A CBM PAPER WITH THE SU ENTERS ITS DECISIVE PHASE.

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I. UNACCEPTABLE TO US WOULD BE AN OUTCOME OF THE COMMITTEE PHASE THAT WOULD TRANSFER THE FURTHER DISCUSSION OF CBM PROBLEMS TO ANY FOLLOW-UP ORGAN OR PERPETUATE SUBCOMMITTEE I FOR THIS PURPOSE BEYOND THE TERMINATION OF CSCE. END TEXT.

2. IN ENSUING DISCUSSION, VON STADEN UNDERLINED FRG CONCERNS ABOUT THE VERY RESTRICTIVE SOVIET APPROACH, WHICH HAS LED TO A STALEMATE AT GENEVA ON CBM'S. THE FRG, HE STRESSED, REGARDS CBM'S AS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN CSCE, WHOSE RESULTS COULD NOT EXCLUDE PROGRESS IN THE SPHERE OF MILITARY SECURITY.

3. HARTMAN WELCOMED FRG WILLINGNESS TO ENVISAGE A COMPROMISE ON THE ISSUE OF ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS, AND READINESS TO ACCEPT LESS THAN ALL OF THE EUROPEAN USSR FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS. HE POINTED OUT THAT ONE OF THE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE FORMULATION IN THE UK DRAFT ON CBM'S IS THAT ITS REFERENCE TO "IN EUROPE" ALLOWS THE SOVIETS THE DIALECTICAL ADVANTAGE OF CLAIMING THAT THEIR CONCEPT OF PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF MANEUVERS IN ZONES NEAR BOUNDARIES

COVERS ALL OF EUROPE, BUT IN FACT IT DOES NOT DEAL WITH THE REAL ISSUE OF REDUCING THE SOURCES OF TENSION IN EUROPE RESULTING FROM MANEUVERS NOT EMBRACED IN BORDER ZONES.

4. HARTMAN SAID FURTHER THAT THE US HAS NOT ENVISAGED CBM'S AS SUITABLE FOR TRADE-OFFS IN CONNECTION WITH OTHER ISSUES UNDER DISCUSSION IN CSCE. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE NOTED THAT THE DISCUSSIONS AT GENEVA ON BASKET 1 APPEARED TO BE POINTING TOWARD AGREEMENT THAT THE ISSUE OF PEACEFUL CHANGE SHOULD BE ADDRESSED IN THE SOVEREIGNTY PARAGRAPH. VON STADEN INDICATED THAT, WHILE THE FRG HAD PREFERRED THAT PEACEFUL CHANGE BE INCLUDED UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS, THEY WERE NOW PREPARED TO ACCEPT ITS PLACEMENT IN THE SOVEREIGNTY PARAGRAPH. IN RESPONSE TO HARTMAN'S QUERY, VON STADEN SAID THAT HE WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY FRG PLAN TO RAISE THEIR VIEWS ON CBM'S FOR DISCUSSION IN NATO AT THIS TIME. 47 RUSH

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